The majority isn't always right. And, given that we don't have a parliamentary system that causes elections to take place if the ruling party over-reaches, I'm comfortable with obstructionism.

What about Prop 8? The majority voted for something, and the was some obstruction on that legislative issue, as I recall.

Proposition 8 was ultimately ruled unconstitutional by a federal court (on different grounds) in 2010, although the court decision did not go into effect until June 26, 2013, following the conclusion of proponents' appeals.

In an age of democratic transition, few questions have greater practical import than that of
constitutional engineering. Yet, relatively little scholarly attention has been devoted to the
impact of different types of constitutional design on policies and policy outcomes within
democratic societies. The evidence presented here suggests that, to the extent that the nature of
the executive makes a difference, parliamentary systems offer significant advantages over
presidential systems. In no case examined here does parliamentary rule seem to detract from
good governance. In most policy areas, particularly in the areas of economic and human
development, parliamentary systems are associated with superior governance.
It remains to explore the specific causal mechanisms by which the structure of the
executive might influence various policy outcomes. To this point, we have merely reviewed
some of the possibilities, as suggested by the voluminous literature on these questions. Plausible
reasons why parliamentarism might lead to better governance include: a) stronger political
parties, b) corporatist interest organization, c) tighter principal-agent relationships within the
various arms of the bureaucracy, d) centralized (national-level) electoral accountability, e) the
capacity for flexible policymaking, f) a more institutionalized political sphere, and g) decisive
leadership. The first section of the paper reviews each of these mechanisms. Is it possible to
arrive at a relatively concise and coherent general theory that ties together and explains the
findings of this (otherwise largely empirical) endeavor?
To this end, we put it forth, provisionally and broadly, that what distinguishes
parliamentarism from presidentialism, and what makes the former a more reliable vehicle for
good public policy, is its capacity to function as a coordination device. The state is often
conceptualized as a solution to the multiple coordination problems that emanate from society.
There are many variations on this theme—joint-decision traps, shirking, under providing of
public goods, overgrazing, the tragedy of the commons, common pool problems, collective
action problems, free rider problems, prisoner’s dilemmas, transaction-cost dilemmas, and so
forth. These are different ways of pointing out a central problem: quite often, when individuals
or groups pursue their own agendas the result is not what society as a whole would prefer.
Coordination problems thus involve a conflict between the part and the whole, between
individual or group rationality and collective rationality.
Arguably, parliamentarism offers better tools for resolving these sorts of difficulties than
presidentialism (within the framework of democracy). This is because parliamentarism
integrates a diversity of views, while providing greater incentives for actors to reach agreement.
Consider a stylized comparison of decisionmaking processes within the two systems. Both
feature a similar set of players: a legislature with majority and minority parties, committees and
separate leadership hierarchies, a cabinet, a chief executive (PM or president), and various
government agencies. Yet, the interaction of these players, and the role that each institution
assumes, tend to be quite different. In parliamentary systems, debate occurs in a highly
institutionalized fashion—within parties, within committees, within leadership groups, across
parties, within the cabinet, and between cabinet-level ministers and high-level civil service
appointees within the bureaucracy. In presidential systems, by contrast, most of these units have
greater independence, and those without independence (such as the cabinet) have very little
power. The players that matter have the capacity, and often the incentive, to say no, or to insist
upon side payments in exchange for support. While successful coordination can occur in this
highly fragmented institutional sphere, resulting agreements may impose higher transaction costs
than one would anticipate within a parliamentary system, where the incentives of the key actors
are generally to reach agreement. This, in turn, is a product of how political careers and electoral
incentives align within these various constitutional systems.
The same sort of contrast operates at “mass” levels. In a parliamentary system, voters are
encouraged to align their perspectives (interests, identity, ideals) with one of the national parties
because these are the political institutions that matter. In a presidential system, voters may
consider not only a candidate’s party membership but also her fealty to the district, along with
various personal characteristics and issue-specific positions that may or may not be consistent
with her party’s national strategy.
Of course, we realize that the actual workings of parliamentarism/presidentialism within
a polity depend upon many additional factors—sociological, economic, political, and
historical—exogenous to the theory. Parliamentarism within a proportional representation
electoral system works differently from parliamentarism in a first-past-the-post electoral system,
for example. However, these additional considerations can for the most part be subsumed under
the ceteris paribus caveat that accompanies all causal reasoning. Parliamentarism should be
more successful in coordinating diverse views and interests than presidentialism, all other things
being equal. This means that the persistent institutional conflicts that characterize political life in
all democracies—e.g., between legislature and executive, between backbenchers and party
leaders, among parties, among diverse agencies, between national and subnational governments,
among subnational governments, and among diverse constituencies—may be easier to solve in a
parliamentary system than in a presidential system. This, in turn, should help to account for the
higher quality of governance observed in parliamentary systems across many policy areas.

rickyp wrote:fate

The majority isn't always right. And, given that we don't have a parliamentary system that causes elections to take place if the ruling party over-reaches, I'm comfortable with obstructionism.

The concept of democracy, and representative democracy, is that the will of the people is recognized, respected and acted upon. Obstruction by a minority that possesses legislative powers and tools outsized to its democratic support is a direct contradiction to the concept of democracy.

You may be comfortable with obstructionism on some issues. I'll bet its easy enough to find instances where obstructionist tactics have thwarted action that you support and where you have decried the inability of the majority to be able to act on their mandate...
Why is approval of Congress so low ? It doesn't do anything.

What about Prop 8? The majority voted for something, and the was some obstruction on that legislative issue, as I recall.

Proposition 8 was ultimately ruled unconstitutional by a federal court (on different grounds) in 2010, although the court decision did not go into effect until June 26, 2013, following the conclusion of proponents' appeals.

-just not what "we" want it to do.

The majority isn't always right. And, given that we don't have a parliamentary system that causes elections to take place if the ruling party over-reaches, I'm comfortable with obstructionism

rickyp wrote:Fate

-just not what "we" want it to do.

we being your point of view.

For example, it could solve the immigration problem in 10 minutes if it weren't for business interests on one side and political interests on the other.

The majority isn't always right. And, given that we don't have a parliamentary system that causes elections to take place if the ruling party over-reaches, I'm comfortable with obstructionism

You fail to recognize that the parliamentary system triggers an election when a party loses a vote in the House. That never happpens (with perhaps a rare exception here or there) when a party has a majority of elected representatives.
Because, if they are the majority they are not "overreaching" when they enact legislation - as long as the legislation does not create unconstitutional law.
What you are comfortable with, is the abrogation of the democratic expression of the majority of people . And what you are unwilling to accept is the right of the majority to govern as they desire.

Hacker, the problem with the US system is that it allows people with Fates self righteous attitude to stop governance.

As it has for a couple of decades (Newt Gingrinch being the architect of much of the obstructionist tactics) but particularly since you elected a black President.

There are other periods in American history where this ocurred for short periods, or here certain issues (slavery) could not be resolved , but the current state of impasse is remarkable. And is far less likely (but not impossible) to occur in a simpler system.
See "Merrick Garland".

There are plenty of governments in the world who operate in a parliamentary system with far fewer checks and balances.

And I said, really, which ones?

And while it's always helpful, I admit, to have other sources to support one's argument,

That's not "my" point of view--it's what Americans across the board want.

So answer my question, please.

some of the current political climate in the US is caused by unresponsive government. The nature of the US form of government is that the large number of "checks and balances" leads to complexity and can lead to obstructionism by an undeserving minority. Complexity allows the elite the levers to manage governance to their benefit and obstructionism provides the ability to the well healed to buy the process. Or at least the stopping of the process.

rickyp wrote:Fate

That's not "my" point of view--it's what Americans across the board want.

And yet, for decades it hasn't been solved. At what point do you not credit the complexity and self negating nature of the legisltive and governance structure as a major contribution to the impasse? You can always blame the people using the system, because its always easy to demonize the opposition. But if the system is simply being the used the way it was designed, then maybe the design of the system needs to be considered as a contributory factor ?

Fate's bleatings merely recall situations (immigration, guns) which demonstrate exactly this designed rigidity and therefore inevitable gridlock in the system, but isn't able to recognize that he's buttressng (sic) my arguement. (sic)

And maybe you could read a little and bring smething (sic) new to the debate than snide and shallow nonsequitars. . Fate already has that market cornered (sic).

Checks and balances are a double-edged sword. You need them to prevent a tyranny of the majority, but if there is too much, then stuff grinds to a halt. You call that obstruction.

In our many discussions on here, one of you in particular has observed (more times than necessary) the "obstructionism" prevalent within the American Government; particularly, within the Congress, or between the branches of government.

But I think where you and I disagree is that you seem to think having even a moderate amount of checks and balances in a system is "too much" and that a parliamentary system doesn't have much at all, and, relying more purely on the will of the people, executes it more accurately

Few checks. But effective checks and balances.
The government of a parliamentary democracy, with a majority in the house, has very few checks on its power.... except the constitution and the need to prepare for the next election. And yet things get done.
Within the legislative process there are also some checks and influences at committee levels and constituents and stake holders have the ability to affect the agenda of the government through lobbying at the various regulatory bodies anddirectly... . But should a government be determined to take a course of action, they can. And they have the 4 or 5 year mandate before an election in which to make their policy work.
The difference Hacker, is that in the US system two majorities (one actually a super majority) and the executive branch are required for a similarly effective period of governance.
And that would only last for two years before an electoral challenge.