30 Jan 2011, 11:53 am
Some posting about Egypt has been done in a thread that was begun about Tunisia, and it's turned into a diffuse argument of some sort. Maybe we can do better here.
As noted elsewhere and in THIS article in today's NYT, the Egyptian military is the most widely respected institution in the country. It was the "Free Officers" movement within the military that spearheaded Egypt's last revolution. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak all were educated in the military academy. The same is true of Omar Suleiman, the spy chief Mubarak just named as apparent successor, but not Mohamed ElBaradei, a possible rival for power. Also, Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak and Suleiman were all born into poor or lower middle-class families; not so ElBaradei, whose father was a very prominent lawyer.
The change of system which took place in the 1950s began with a relatively bloodless military coup, and continued for five years or so, concluding when Nasser officially formed the political party that would win all following elections (to this day). In the interim there were the exile of King Farouk; friction between revolutionary secular socialists and communists (with communist-led workers' riots); over half a year of "street riots, clashes, arson, and civil tumult"; land "reform" whereby the socialist Free Officers took the land of the royals, Jews, Greeks, and Copts for themselves and their close supporters; miscellaneous assassinations and executions; the outlawing of the Muslim Brotherhood; the Suez Crisis; some ethnic cleansing; and assorted "assaults, robberies, rapes, or murder".
Now it might be tempting to say that such events, which few alive can remember, have little or no relevance to what's taking place today. But in a very real sense the "republican" revolution was not only never completed, it continued to be actively fought year after year right up to the present. The regime has always had to use revolutionary tactics (i.e. violence and extra-legal procedures) against those it perceived as threats, including Islamists and democrats. The regime has rigidly controlled the formation and activities of political parties and thus, despite holding elections, has never allowed Egypt to emerge from what might politely be called "emergency" circumstances. And as so often happens when a regime is able to avoid democratic pressures and transparency, corruption is rampant.
The revolution of the 1950s was in some senses a response to the fact that political power was being exercised for purposes largely unrelated to the needs and aspirations of the people of Egypt. Although the revolution was technically successful, the ends of the employment of political power did not shift substantially toward the people.
[One of the beneficiaries of the shift was the military, and I find it a bit ironic that the military attained such a position of respect among the masses. The Egyptian Armed Forces are "influential in business, engaging in road and housing construction, consumer goods and resort management." But there's universal conscription and the military academies are among the more egalitarian of public institutions.]
The people of Egypt today still feel, it seems, that political power has not been exercised simply for the public good. (They are, of course, quite correct.) Something is certainly going to change. But is Egypt any more prepared today than they were 55 years ago to develop a system truly responsive to the needs of the people? Will the military end up spearheading this revolution as well, and if so will it do any better? I don't know. What are your thoughts?
As noted elsewhere and in THIS article in today's NYT, the Egyptian military is the most widely respected institution in the country. It was the "Free Officers" movement within the military that spearheaded Egypt's last revolution. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak all were educated in the military academy. The same is true of Omar Suleiman, the spy chief Mubarak just named as apparent successor, but not Mohamed ElBaradei, a possible rival for power. Also, Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak and Suleiman were all born into poor or lower middle-class families; not so ElBaradei, whose father was a very prominent lawyer.
The change of system which took place in the 1950s began with a relatively bloodless military coup, and continued for five years or so, concluding when Nasser officially formed the political party that would win all following elections (to this day). In the interim there were the exile of King Farouk; friction between revolutionary secular socialists and communists (with communist-led workers' riots); over half a year of "street riots, clashes, arson, and civil tumult"; land "reform" whereby the socialist Free Officers took the land of the royals, Jews, Greeks, and Copts for themselves and their close supporters; miscellaneous assassinations and executions; the outlawing of the Muslim Brotherhood; the Suez Crisis; some ethnic cleansing; and assorted "assaults, robberies, rapes, or murder".
Now it might be tempting to say that such events, which few alive can remember, have little or no relevance to what's taking place today. But in a very real sense the "republican" revolution was not only never completed, it continued to be actively fought year after year right up to the present. The regime has always had to use revolutionary tactics (i.e. violence and extra-legal procedures) against those it perceived as threats, including Islamists and democrats. The regime has rigidly controlled the formation and activities of political parties and thus, despite holding elections, has never allowed Egypt to emerge from what might politely be called "emergency" circumstances. And as so often happens when a regime is able to avoid democratic pressures and transparency, corruption is rampant.
The revolution of the 1950s was in some senses a response to the fact that political power was being exercised for purposes largely unrelated to the needs and aspirations of the people of Egypt. Although the revolution was technically successful, the ends of the employment of political power did not shift substantially toward the people.
[One of the beneficiaries of the shift was the military, and I find it a bit ironic that the military attained such a position of respect among the masses. The Egyptian Armed Forces are "influential in business, engaging in road and housing construction, consumer goods and resort management." But there's universal conscription and the military academies are among the more egalitarian of public institutions.]
The people of Egypt today still feel, it seems, that political power has not been exercised simply for the public good. (They are, of course, quite correct.) Something is certainly going to change. But is Egypt any more prepared today than they were 55 years ago to develop a system truly responsive to the needs of the people? Will the military end up spearheading this revolution as well, and if so will it do any better? I don't know. What are your thoughts?
